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1 Introduction
Deregulated electricity markets are characterised by very considerable price volatility. This is
mainly due to the fact that electricity is not an easily storable commodity, and is likely to in-
crease as the penetration of wind power in the overall generation mix increases. Such volatility,
unless perfectly correlated in any two markets, creates arbitrage opportunities for owners of
transmission capacity between those markets and becomes a significant component of the eco-
nomic rationale for interconnection investment. However, the bulk of existing academic litera-
ture on the economics of electricity transmission is theoretical and largely ignores market price
volatility to concentrate on consistent price differences between markets1. This paper attempts
to fill this gap by taking an empirical approach and explicitly modelling volatility in electricity
markets in a way that closely mimics its actual observed characteristics.
The model presented here takes its inspiration from the interconnector between the Nether-
lands and Norway (NorNed), which has been in operation since May 2008, and the intercon-
nector between the Netherlands and the UK (BritNed), which is under construction at the time
of writing. However, the methodology and the results are widely applicable to interconnectors
built elsewhere. The outputs of the model are distributions of electricity prices in the connected
markets after the construction of the interconnectors and the revenues derived from the inter-
connectors2. The predicted revenues determine the prospects for private sector investment in
merchant interconnectors. Hence the model presented here helps to determine whether a pro-
posed interconnector is likely to be attractive to profit-seeking investors. The distribution of
1See Section 2 for further details
2The size of the interconnectors is allowed to vary in the simulations
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electricity prices is the main factor affecting the pattern of investment in generation capacity
and is also a determinant of consumer welfare. Since wholesale suppliers generally absorb any
short-term variation in prices, only the mean of the distribution of prices directly affects con-
sumer welfare. However, other properties of the price distribution, such as the variance, matter
for the pattern of generation investment since some generation plants only produce when the
price is very high. If an interconnector reduces price variance in a given market, investment in
high variable cost generation becomes less profitable.
Another aim of this paper is to determine some of the main drivers of interconnector revenues.
In terms of the motivating example, Norway is rich in reservoir generation while the UK and
the Netherlands have a large share of thermal generation, hence the average daily and weekly
pattern of electricity prices is generally more flat in Norway than in the Netherlands or the UK as
reservoir generators can be expected to arbitrage consistent hourly and daily price differences.
This can be seen in Figure 1. One would expect electricity prices in the UK and the Netherlands
to be driven by the cost of producing electricity from fossil fuels and electricity prices in Norway
to be determined by the deviation of reservoir levels from the seasonal norm. NorNed revenue
could therefore be expected to be driven by different patterns of hourly and daily prices in the
Netherlands and Norway, prolonged differences in mean prices related to reservoir levels in
Norway and changes in fuel prices. The consistent hourly, daily and seasonal price differences
between the UK and the Netherlands are much lower. However, the stochastic price shocks in
the two countries are not perfectly correlated, meaning that arbitrage opportunities are likely to
arise on a regular basis even without a consistent difference in average prices.
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Figure 1: Average historic hourly prices between 1 Jan 2006 and 12 Mar 2009
The methodology adopted here improves on existing empirical literature on interconnectors in
a number of ways. For example, Littlechild (2004) concludes that revenue from the Murraylink
interconnector in Australia is unlikely to cover its costs on the basis of the absolute difference
in mean prices between the two connected regions. He also argues that revenue can be gener-
ated by an interconnector without any difference in average prices no formal model of arbitrage
on the basis of price volatility is presented. Instead, the author cites the historic financial per-
formance and utilisation ratio of the Murraylink interconnector for a given year. This paper
3
presents a formal model that does not require onerous simplifying assumptions when simulat-
ing electricity prices. It separates prices into their deterministic and stochastic components,
allowing complete control over both and making it general enough to accurately simulate the
effects of interconnectors built between markets with very different properties. Thus among
other questions, this paper also helps to answer the question of how important consistent price
differences are relative to stochastic price differences in determining interconnector revenue
and examines some of the key drivers of those differences.
The deterministic components of electricity prices, which include predictable hourly, daily and
seasonal variations, are estimated through time series regression. The distributions of stochas-
tic components of prices, which include factors such as unexpected changes in fuel prices, are
obtained from the residuals of those regressions by bootstrapping, i.e. sampling with replace-
ment, from the empirical distribution of the regression residuals. The stochastic properties
of prices are incorporated into the model through the properties of the distribution of boot-
strapped residuals. Correlations in stochastic price shocks in different countries are obtained
from the empirical distribution of the regression residuals and also incorporated into the model.
Both the deterministic and stochastic components of prices are simulated by closely controlling
their properties. These properties are put into context firstly by estimating the effect of changes
in fuel prices on electricity price levels and secondly by estimating the effect of increasing pen-
etration of wind generation on electricity price volatility. The latter effect is calibrated from the
estimates provided in Green and Vasilakos (2009).
The effect of electricity flows over interconnectors on prices and thus on interconnector rev-
enues is modelled explicitly by a mathematical algorithm. Interconnector flows are determined
endogenously in the model from the simulated prices in the connected markets. The price effect
of flows over an interconnector is calibrated for market size and interconnector capacity from re-
sults obtained in Parail (2009). These are estimates of the effect of flows over the 700MW NorNed
interconnector on the hourly day ahead electricity prices in the Netherlands and South Norway,
obtained using an autoregressive time series econometric model. Assuming that NorNed is used
up to its full capacity, the estimated average effect of flows from Norway to the Netherlands is
to reduce the price in the Netherlands by 2.6% and to increase the South Norway nodal price by
4.2%. The effect of flows over an interconnector on UK prices is assumed to be the same as for
prices in the Netherlands, adjusted for market size, as both markets are characterised by a large
share of thermal generation in the overall generation mix.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 puts the paper in the context of related lit-
erature. Section 3 firstly sets out the methodology for estimating the deterministic and stochas-
tic components of electricity prices, including details of the bootstrap procedure used to derive
the underlying distribution of stochastic shocks. It then explains how electricity prices and the
effect of interconnectors on those prices are simulated. Section 4 derives some results on inter-
connector revenues and the effect of interconnectors on electricity prices, abstracting from the
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examples of NorNed and BritNed. Section 5 concludes.
Any reference to ’price’ or ’electricity price’ in this paper refers to the hourly day-ahead elec-
tricity price as determined on the relevant exchange unless specifically stated otherwise. Since
electricity is traded on a half-hourly basis in the UK, an average of the two half-hourly prices is
taken in order to bring it into line with hourly pricing in the Netherlands and South Norway. For
ease of notation, and especially in tables, the Netherlands, South Norway and UK are referred to
as ’NL,’ ’NO’ and ’GB’ respectively.
2 Literature review
The literature on trading in electricity between spatially separated markets is related to the the-
ory of international trade. However, when making a comparison between the two different
strands of literature, one must be mindful of the properties of electricity markets that differenti-
ate them from other markets. One crucial property is the fact that electricity can only be traded
up to the capacity of the relevant transmission cable in any given period. In international trade
literature, this is equivalent to a trade quota. One paper that is relevant in this context is Kr-
ishna (1989). It models price competition between two firms, one domestic and one foreign.
Both make differentiated products that are imperfect substitutes for one another. In this set-
ting, the paper examines the relative welfare implications of trade quotas and tariffs in terms
of consumer and domestic producer surplus. The model in the presence of quotas bears close
resemblance to Borenstein et al. (2000), except that the latter model quantity rather than price
competition. Since electricity is fundamentally a uniform commodity, it cannot be subject to
product differentiation between firms.
Krishna’s paper is a special case of a whole class of literature on international trade under im-
perfect competition. The issues relating to the competitiveness of electricity markets are not
considered here explicitly. Any exercise of market power by generators is implicitly part of the
estimate of the price effects of interconnectors as derived in Parail (2009). This means that if
incumbent generators respond to electricity imports over an interconnector by increasing their
output, this effect would be incorporated into the econometric estimate of the price effect of
those imports.
The electricity industry bears many resemblances to other industries that are divided into spa-
tially separated markets. However, it also displays certain characteristics that are not typical
of many other goods. Firstly, it is an infinitely divisible and uniform commodity that is not
amenable to product differentiation. Secondly, given the existence of appropriate transmission
infrastructure, it can be transported instantaneously and almost costlessly between different
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markets. This means that, given the existence of liquid markets, any price differences between
spatially separated and adequately connected markets can be arbitraged with ease that resem-
bles arbitrage in financial markets. However, neither financial arbitrage nor trade in goods or
commodities are normally subject to the same physical limits on shipping capacity as is the
case with electricity transmission. Finally, electricity cannot be stored in high volumes unless
significant reservoir capacity is available and hence, unlike for other goods and commodities,
arbitrage in electricity in most markets can only take place between different regions and not
across time3. This means that electricity supplied in one time period does not represent the
same product as electricity supplied in another time period.
Most literature dealing with the effects of DC transmission cables between spatially separated
markets models the formation of electricity prices as a deterministic process. This applies to
Joskow and Tirole (2000), who show that allowing generators to hold physical rights to transmis-
sion capacity may give them the incentive to create network congestion. They assume that the
difference in market prices between two nodes is constant and results from differing generation
costs, hence electricity flows across an interconnector would only ever be one way. It is also true
of one of the most frequently quoted papers in this field, Borenstein et al. (2000). They model
the effects of connecting two identical monopolistic electricity markets with constant demand
and generation costs on the behaviour of incumbent monopolists. Like much of the rest of the
literature, and indeed this paper, they adopt the concept of nodal pricing. Under this assump-
tion, if there is no congestion, electricity prices are the same in both markets. When the network
is congested, transmission capacity is rationed using the price mechanism and the owner of that
capacity collects the associated scarcity rent.
Borenstein et al. (2000) find that when the capacity of the transmission line is above a certain
threshold, the two firms act as a duopoly and prices in the two markets are lowered from the
monopoly level. No actual power needs to flow down the interconnector to guarantee this out-
come, which stems from this being a deterministic model with two identical producers on either
side of the interconnector. Below this threshold, there are no pure strategy equilibria, but the ex-
pected amount of electricity sold into each market in mixed strategy equilibria is higher than the
monopoly level of output and increasing in transmission line capacity. Based on these results,
the authors conclude that the social value of transmission capacity may not be closely related
to the actual flows of electricity across the interconnector.
Whilst much of the literature in this field takes the existing transmission network as given, some
papers have examined the decision to invest in transmission capacity. One such paper is Joskow
and Tirole (2005). This paper also assumes that electricity prices, and hence the factors that
drive them, are deterministic. The authors show that numerous imperfections in energy mar-
kets lead to the social and private benefits of transmission investment diverging. Existence of
3See Newbery (1984) for an examination of price stabilization of storable commodities
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market power at one node leads the local generators to withhold capacity relative to the compet-
itive level, driving up the price at that node and increasing the amount of power transmitted to
that node. This leads to an incentive to over-invest in transmission capacity. Likewise, they show
that lumpiness of transmission investment, or in other words the availability of economies of
scale, leads to sub-optimal incentives to invest. This happens for the same reason as the unwill-
ingness of owners of existing transmission capacity to increase that capacity. Increasing capac-
ity tends to reduce their existing congestion rent. Economies of scale make it optimal to invest
in transmission capacity non-incrementally. However, the decision on the profit-maximising
capacity investment now has to take into account the effect that investment on the margin will
have on the revenue from non-marginal capacity investment.
One paper that considers the problem of connecting separate electricity markets characterised
by stochastic prices is Anderson et al. (2007). In particular, changes in electricity prices are
driven by stochastic demand shocks. It is a natural compliment to this paper because it tests the
extent to which such a problem can be solved analytically in contrast to the simulation approach
adopted here. In order to make an analytical solution feasible, Anderson et al. make a number
of simplifying assumptions. The first assumption is that market players do not behave strate-
gically, and hence their behaviour does not change after the construction of an interconnector.
The electricity price at each separate node is determined by a System Operator (SO). Generators
submit their cost functions to the SO and buyers submit their demand schedule with quantities
corresponding to different prices. The SO then finds the optimum solution which, given the
assumption of non-strategic behaviour by market participants, would constitute a Walrasian
equilibrium. This optimisation methodology is also employed after the interconnector is built.
The assumption that differentiates their paper from this one and also the majority of the litera-
ture is that the interconnector has unlimited capacity. Instead of modelling capacity constraints,
they model a quadratic loss function that applies to any electricity flows over the interconnec-
tor. Finally, for the bulk of their analysis, it is assumed that the distributions of demands at the
two nodes on each end of the interconnector are independent.
Since market-based transmission investment is a relatively recent phenomenon, lagging behind
electricity market liberalisation, empirical literature on this topic has been constrained by data
availability and is still in the early stages of development. One paper that combines theoretical
arguments with the use of data to support them is Brunekreeft (2003), where the author sets out
to define the natural domains of regulatory and market-based transmission investment. Lit-
tlechild (2003) also straddles the line between empirical and theoretical work on this topic by
discussing the Australian experience of developing market-based investment alongside more
traditional regulatory investment in the case of Murraylink and SNI. The empirical part of the
paper makes an estimate of the revenue from the Murraylink interconnector on the basis of the
absolute difference in mean prices between the two connected regions, as well as historic fi-
nancial performance and utilisation ratio. Without making any formal estimates, the paper also
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argues that revenue can be generated by an interconnector without any difference in average
prices.
Finally, this paper builds on Parail (2009), which estimates the effects of the NorNed intercon-
nector on day-ahead electricity prices in NL and NO using a time series econometric model. The
estimates obtained in that paper are used to calibrate the price effects of interconnectors simu-
lated here. The paper uses those estimates to argue that the profits gained by private owners of
interconnection capacity do not fall far short of the social benefits, implying that merchant in-
terconnector investment is capable of filling the gap left by regulated cross-border investment.
3 Methodology
3.1 Overview
Rather than relying on restrictive assumptions in order to produce analytical solutions to a sim-
plified set of questions, this paper adopts a simulation methodology that allows a broader set
of questions to be answered in a more realistic setting. For the purposes of experiments con-
ducted here, it separates out the deterministic and stochastic components of electricity prices
and simulates them separately whilst mimicking their properties as closely as possible. This
methodology allows a lot of flexibility in varying model parameters and price properties in order
to simulate an almost unlimited number of scenarios. Among other things, this could include
simulating the likely effect of increasing wind penetration on electricity price volatility and ulti-
mately on interconnector revenues.
The deterministic components of electricity prices, which include predictable daily and sea-
sonal variations, are obtained through time series regression using historical data between 1
January 2006 and 3 March 2009. The stochastic components of electricity prices are all the
determinants of electricity prices that are not explained by the independent variables in the
regression, as well as the variation in the effect of those independent variables. These are in-
corporated into the model through the properties of the distribution of bootstrapped residuals,
which are obtained by bootstrapping, i.e. sampling with replacement, from the empirical distri-
bution of the regression residuals. Correlations in stochastic price shocks in different countries
are obtained from the empirical distribution of the regression residuals.
Some factors cannot be accurately predicted far in advance, such as the effect of changing fuel
prices on the electricity price level or the effect of an increasing share of wind power in a coun-
try’s overall generation mix on the volatility of electricity prices. This is because fuel prices or the
actual level of wind penetration are, to a large extent, unpredictable over a long time horizon.
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They are therefore represented as stochastic components in the model. However, forecasters
may wish to examine scenarios that make assumptions on these factors. To make this possible
within the framework presented here, relationships between gas and electricity prices in the GB
and NL are estimated using a Vector Error Correction Model. The effect of wind penetration on
electricity prices is calibrated using estimates taken from Green and Vasilakos (2009).
Having obtained a set of prices with the desired stochastic and deterministic properties, this
paper simulates the response of those prices to electricity flows across interconnectors using an
algorithm described in Section 3.5, with the full derivation being given in Appendix D. The algo-
rithm mimics an efficient market coupling mechanism. Given exogenously determined prices
in the connected markets before any connection is simulated, for each period, it calculates the
market equilibrium solution and optimum flows over interconnectors given the transmission
constraints. The outputs of the model include the distribution of prices on either end of a sim-
ulated interconnector and the revenue of that interconnector. Thus the methodology set out
here is able to determine how the properties of electricity prices in the connected markets affect
the revenue of an interconnector and, given those properties, how the interconnector is likely to
affect the entire distribution of prices in those markets. Simulation results are put into context
of fuel price changes and the effect of wind power on electricity prices to determine how these
factors influence interconnector revenues.
3.2 Estimating deterministic and stochastic components of prices
Since this paper uses NorNed and BritNed interconnectors as an inspiration, the first step in
the analysis is to examine the properties and determinants of hourly electricity prices in the
three regions that would be connected by those links, namely NL, GB and NO. The aim is to
separate out the deterministic and stochastic components of electricity prices and to simulate
them separately. This allows us to specify the deterministic and stochastic properties of prices
freely for the purposes of simulation, depending on the scenario being simulated.
Deterministic components are deemed to be those that can be predicted far in advance and
with a high level of precision. For each set of electricity prices, these are modelled as separate
dummy variables that represent each hour of the day, each day of the week, each month of the
year and any public holidays that do not fall on a weekend. In the case of NO prices, these are
also variables that represent the expected reservoir levels in three different regions of Norway
on the basis of historical data4.
The stochastic components of electricity prices are deemed to be the residuals that cannot be
explained by regressing electricity prices against their deterministic components. As an ini-
tial step towards separating out the deterministic and stochastic components of prices, an OLS
4Average reservoir levels calculated for the period between 1 Jan 1990 and 31 Dec 2003
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regression of log electricity prices against the full set of observable deterministic variables is
carried out. The histograms of residuals from these regressions are given below. In each dia-
gram, the red line represents a plot of a normal distribution with the same mean and variance
parameters as the corresponding sample.
Figure 2: OLS regression residuals for log NL price
Figure 3: OLS regression residuals for log GB price
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Figure 4: OLS regression residuals for log NO price
It is immediately apparent that, with the possible exception of residuals from the log NL price
regression, these distributions are irregular and do not resemble any known parametric distri-
bution.
Figure 5 demonstrates a potential reason why the distributions of OLS residuals for GB and NO
prices have such irregular shapes. The autocorrelation functions for those residuals shows a
very high degree of persistence even at lags of up to 200 periods. This means that any significant
price shocks that are not explained by the exogenous variables in those regressions are likely to
persist for a large number of periods, creating local peaks in the distribution of residuals.
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Figure 5: Autocrrelation functions of OLS residuals
Estimating the regressions using an ARMA in the disturbances model gives consistent and un-
biased estimates of the deterministic components of electricity prices in the presence of auto-
correlated residuals. The model is formulated as follows
yt =
K∑
i=1
xt iβi +µt
µt =
P∑
p=1
φpµt−p +
Q∑
q=1
θq²t−q +²t .
The first equation is a structural equation and the second equation specifies the ARMA structure
of the disturbances. The explanatory variables in the structural equation are as in the original
OLS regression. This model is estimated using conditional maximum likelihood, which, given
the large number of observations, should yield the same results as unconditional maximum
likelihood. Autoregressive terms in the residuals are included or excluded on the basis of the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)5. Regression outputs for the three ARMA models, including
5The AIC is a method of model selection by which the model with the lowest AIC value is chosen as the best.
The value of AIC is given by 2k−2ln(L), where k is the number of model parameters, i.e. explanatory variables and
autoregressive terms, and ln(L) is the maximum value of the log likelihood function of the estimated model
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the estimated coefficients of the deterministic factors and their respective standard errors and
confidence intervals are given below. Variable names are defined as follows. NL, NO and GB
represent log hourly electricity prices. H1−H23 are hourly dummy variables. mon − sat are
week day dummy variables. j an −nov are monthly dummy variables. nlhol and gbhol are
dummy variables for public holidays in NL and GB. norned represents flows from NO to NL
over the NorNed interconnector in units of 100 MW. break is a dummy variable assigned to any
period after NorNed comes online. res represents the historic average reservoir level in South
Norway corresponding to a given weekly period, expressed in percentage terms. AR and MA
prefixes represent autoregressive and moving average terms in the residuals ARMA equation.
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Figure 6: NL ARMA regression results
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Figure 7: GB ARMA regression results
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Figure 8: NO ARMA regression results
Although the effect of unexpected changes in fuel and European Union Emission Trading Sys-
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tem (EU ETS) prices on electricity prices are classed as stochastic factors, for the purposes of
scenario building and to give context to the simulations presented in Section 4.2, these effects
are examined here. Daily as opposed to hourly data is used in regressions since gas, coal and
EU ETS prices are quoted on a daily basis6. For the purposes of this analysis, hourly electricity
prices are weighted by the system load for the corresponding hour and aggregated into daily
prices.
The relationship between daily fuel prices and average daily electricity prices is determined by
several factors. Since the price of electricity is set by the marginal plant, the cost to a marginal
plant of converting a given type of fuel into electricity is one such factor. Another factor is
whether the marginal generation technology is the same across peak and off-peak hours. Also,
since varying fuel prices can change the merit order of generating plants, the degree of sub-
stitutability between different types of generation technology and the relationship between the
prices of alternative fuels are other such factors. If coal becomes prohibitively expensive relative
to gas and it is possible to satisfy all demand using gas fired generation, above a certain price
threshold, the relationship between the price of electricity and the price of coal would be non-
existent. However, if there is no spare capacity in the system, expensive coal would always be
the marginal generation technology. In that case, coal and electricity prices could be expected
to change proportionally7.
In the short-run, significant deviations can take place from the relationship described above.
This can quite clearly be seen in Figure 9. It plots the average daily NL electricity price against
daily NL gas, NL coal and EU ETS prices, all of which are indexed at the beginning of the sample
period. While the NL electricity price tracks the gas price quite closely in the medium term, it is
considerably more volatile even on a daily level, which masks a great deal of intra-day volatility
in the electricity price. The same may be observed in Figure 10 for the average daily GB electric-
ity price, though changes in the price of electricity track changes in GB coal and EU ETS prices
as well as the price of gas.
6Closing daily prices from the day-ahead market are used in each case and are sourced from Bloomberg. The
APX gas price and the EEX coal price are used for NL. NBP gas and coal prices are used for GB
7All these factors may be characterised as medium term. Over a longer time horizon, investment makes differ-
ent generation technologies almost perfect substitutes. However, investment takes time and investors need to be
convinced that changes in fuel prices are permanent if the pattern of generation investment is to be influenced by
those changes. Given the time span of the data set used in this paper, the long-run relationship between electricity
prices and fuel prices is outside of the scope of our analysis
17
Figure 9: Daily NL electricity and fuel prices
Figure 10: Daily GB electricity and fuel prices
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The appropriate econometric technique would need to estimate the medium-term equilibrium
relationship between fuel prices and electricity prices. This cannot be achieved using a standard
regression methodology because it only captures contemporaneous co-movement in relevant
prices. An alternative is available in the form of the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM),
as proposed in Engle and Granger (1987). Among related applied papers which employ this
model, Brown and Yucel (2008) use it to estimate the long-run relationship between crude oil
and natural gas prices in the US. The VECM allows a relationship between two or more variables
that may themselves be non-stationary to be estimated consistently. Depending on the extent of
autocorrelation specified in the model, it allows for prolonged departures from the equilibrium
relationship. The model is specified by the following equations:
PE ,t =α+βPF,t +²t
4PE ,t = a+γ(CIt−1)+
n∑
i=1
bi4PE ,t−i +
n∑
i=1
ci4PF,t−i +µt
4PF,t = d +δ(CIt−1)+
n∑
i=1
ei4PF,t−i +
n∑
i=1
fi4PE ,t−i +νt .
The first equation represents the cointegrating relationship. PE ,t and PF,t represent log electric-
ity and fuel prices in period t respectively and corresponding4 represent their first differences.
CIt = ²t is the period t equilibrium error in the cointegrating relationship as specified in the first
equation.
The first step is to determine whether the relevant variables are stationary. This is done using
the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock efficient test under the null hypothesis of a unit root. This test is
similar to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test but is adjusted for heteroskedastic errors and allows
for a trend in a stationary time series. The test is applied at lag 1 and also at an optimal lag chosen
by the Ng-Perron sequential t-test. Table 1 gives the test results. The highlighted test statistics
indicate that the corresponding variable is not stationary, i.e. the null hypothesis of a unit root
cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level.
Table 1: Unit root tests
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For both sets of coal prices and the EU ETS price, the results are clear-cut. The null hypothesis of
a unit root cannot be rejected. However, for both sets of electricity and gas prices, the results are
less clear-cut. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at lag 1, but cannot be rejected at the
corresponding optimal lag chosen by the Ng-Perron sequential test. This means that electricity
and gas prices are likely to lie on the borderline between a unit root and a stationary but strongly
autocorrelated time series.
Error Correction Models are able to estimate the relationship between two or more non-stationary
variables consistently only if those variables are cointegrated, which means that the relationship
between them is actually stationary8. Likewise, they would give consistent estimates of the rela-
tionship between two or more strongly autocorrelated but stationary variables. This is shown in
Keele and De Boef (2004), who derive the Error Correction Model from the Autoregressive Dis-
tributed Lag (ADL) model as in Bannerjee (1993) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) to prove
this result. To check where the VECM model may be used with NL and GB data, the next step is to
apply the Johansen test for cointegration in a pairwise fashion. Failure to reject the null hypoth-
esis of a cointegrating relationship would indicate that the relationship between two variables is
not stationary. Among other reasons, this could happen if one of the variables is stationary and
the other one is not since the relationship between a stationary variable and a non-stationary
one is non-stationary by construction.
Table 2 lists the results of the Johansen test for pairwise cointegrating relationships. The table
gives Johansen test statistics and the 5% critical value in brackets for each relevant pairwise
relationship9. The highlighted statistics are those where the 5% critical value for a cointegrating
relationship has been exceeded.
Table 2: Johansen test
Results of the test suggest that the relationship between log electricity and log gas prices can be
consistently estimated for both NL and NO. However, estimates of the relationship between log
8See Chapter 19 in Hamilton, J.D. (1994), “Time Series Analysis,” Princeton University Press
9All tests are carried out using lags of up to order 13. This number was chosen on the basis of the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC)
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electricity prices and log coal prices or log EU ETS prices derived from an Error Correction Model
may not be consistent. Analysis of these relationships would only be possible after differencing
one or both variables to make them stationary. Unfortunately, much of the information would
be lost is the process of differencing, rendering the subsequent analysis meaningless.
A simple test for the presence of error correcting behaviour, as suggested in Keele and De Boef,
is to estimate an ADL model10, given by
PE ,t =α0+
n∑
i=1
αiPE ,t−i +
m∑
j=0
β jPF,t− j +²t
and then test the joint significance of coefficients of the lagged electricity price and current and
lagged gas prices. A positive result would indicate the presence of error correcting behaviour.
For both NL and GB regressions, testing for error correcting behaviour in the relationship be-
tween electricity and gas prices in NL and GB gives a positive result. 11.
The next step is to estimate pairwise cointegrating relationships between electricity prices and
gas prices in GB and NL. The full results of this exercise may be seen in Figures 11 and 12.
10Estimates from the ADL model are consistent as long as the residuals in that regression are iid
11Test conducted at the 95% confidence level. Various configurations of the ADL model yield this result, the most
parsimonious being one that uses a first order lag of the electricity price and a seventh order lag of the gas price.
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Figure 11: Results: NL Vector Error Correction Model
22
Figure 12: Results: GB Vector Error Correction Model
We are interested in the medium-term co-movement between electricity prices and gas prices.
This is given by the two cointegrating equations as follows:
NLt = 0.40+0.90NLGt +²t
GBt =−0.27+1.08GBGt +²t .
Prices in the cointegrating equation are in logs, hence β = 1 would imply that the two prices
change proportionally with one another in the long run. Whilst all of the above parameters
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are significant at the 95% confidence level, they should be interpreted carefully. No definitive
statements about the direction of causality can be made without further tests because prices are
driven by both supply and demand. Demand for electricity and prices of alternative fuels are all
determinants of demand for a given type of fuel. At the same time, fuel prices are determinants
of supply of electricity.
On the basis of the estimates derived by the VECM model, it is possible to say with some con-
fidence that, both in the GB and NL, electricity and gas prices move roughly in line with one
another in the medium term. What can be surmised from Figures 9 and 10 is that the NL elec-
tricity price tracks the NL gas price very closely and does not appear to be influenced by the
price of coal. On the other hand, the GB electricity price takes more prolonged departures from
equilibrium with the electricity price12 and does appear to be influenced by the price of coal,
though the latter assertion cannot be tested econometrically.
3.3 Bootstrapping stochastic components of prices
Estimates of deterministic properties of electricity prices can be made using the ARMA regres-
sion methodology as described in Section 3.2. It is more difficult to establish the distributional
properties of the stochastic elements of electricity prices, represented by µt in the ARMA model
set out in Section 3.2. The reason is that autocorrelation in µt produces an irregular distribution
unless the sample size is extremely large and way beyond the available sample size.
Residuals from the ARMA model, represented by ²t , are serially uncorrelated, have a regular
shape and can be approximated by a parametric distribution. However, it is not good enough to
simulate ²t and then apply the serial correlation structure implied by the fitted ARMA model to
produce µt . Fundamentally, it would not help to answer the question of what distribution the
future stochastic price shocks would likely be drawn from. This methodology would effectively
only produce one observation since the serial correlation structure is only applied once. It is
possible to approximate the true underlying distribution of residuals by repeating this process
many times for randomly selected ²t , but given that experiments require altering the parameters
of the simulated distribution, the computational burden of applying this methodology several
times and in several experiments would be overwhelming.
A computationally viable alternative lies in using a variation on the bootstrap methodology.
Bootstrapping, which was first introduced by Efron (1979), is a way of artificially generating a
12This observation is confirmed by plotting the autocorrelation functions for ²t , the residual in the cointegrating
equation between electricity and gas prices in NL and GB, which may be seen in Appendix B. For GB, the resid-
uals show a greater degree of autocorrelation, which would correspond to more prolonged departures from the
equilibrium relationship between GB electricity and GB gas prices
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population out of a sample by repeated random sampling with replacement from an empirical
distribution of the observed data. The bootstrap is asymptotically consistent as long as the un-
derlying population is i.i.d., the observed data is independently sampled from the population
and samples taken from the empirical distribution of the observed data are independent. This
methodology is most frequently used to generate confidence intervals for statistical inference,
but it is easily extended to generating a sample distribution for the purposes of simulation.
Efron’s standard bootstrap would fail for dependent data because it ignores the order of obser-
vations in resampling. More specifically, it is inappropriate for the simulations undertaken in
this paper because the stochastic determinants of electricity prices are serially correlated, thus
violating the i.i.d. assumption. However, dependence is a ubiquitous feature of time series mod-
els and solutions to this problem exist. There are two common approaches to bootstrapping de-
pendent data. The first approach involves modelling serially uncorrelated disturbances together
with a model of dependence. Bose (1988) demonstrates that, in the context of an autoregressive
model, bootstrapping the serially uncorrelated disturbances and applying the model of depen-
dence produces the same level of correction as a standard bootstrap for i.i.d. data. However, this
methodology is sensitive to model specification and thus does not posses the non-parametric
property of the standard bootstrap. An alternative approach known as the block bootstrap was
pioneered by Kunsch (1989). It involves resampling blocks of sequential observations from the
original sample, thus preserving the serial correlation within those blocks but destroying it be-
tween blocks. Careful selection of block size, which would depend on the nature of serial cor-
relation and the sample size, should ensure that enough of the essential features of the original
sample are preserved in the process. This approach is non-parametric but risks neglecting some
key features of the original sample if the block size chosen is too small, that choice being rather
ad hoc.
A combination of the two approaches detailed above involves approximating an infinite dimen-
sional non-parametric model by a sequence of finite-dimensional parametric models. This is
known as the method of sieves, as detailed in Buhlmann (1997) and also described in Politis
(2003). The method of sieves is adopted in this paper. To begin with, an autoregressive process
is fitted to the dependent data. In the context of this paper, the dependent data is represented
by the serially correlated residuals µt in the ARMA model of electricity prices. Define the or-
der of the autoregressive process as p(n), where n is the size of the entire sample of dependent
data. The order p(n) must be increasing with sample size n such that p(n)→∞ as n→∞ with
p(n) = o(n). This implies that p(n)/n → 0 as n →∞. Buhlmann (1997) suggests that selecting
the autoregressive model on the basis of the AIC satisfies this condition.
Thereafter, resampling is based on the autoregressive process fitted to the serially correlated
residuals µt as follows. Residuals ²t from the autoregressive process are given by
²t =
p(n)∑
j=0
φ j
(
µt− j − µ¯
)
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where φ0 = 1 and t = p + 1, ....,n. This means that the first p residual values from the fitted
regression are thrown away. The remaining residuals are centred such that
²ˆt = ²t − (n−p)−1
n∑
t=p+1
²t .
Resampling is done from the empirical distribution of ²ˆt , defining the bootstrap sample µbt by
the recursion
²˜t =
p(n)∑
j=0
φ j
(
µbt− j − µ¯
)
,
where ²˜t is sampled with replacement from ²ˆt . In other words, resampling is carried out by re-
peatedly applying the fitted autoregressive model to blocks of randomly sampled i.i.d. ARMA
residuals ²˜t to produce samples characterised by autocorrelation as specified in the fitted au-
toregressive model. For every such block, the initial value is assumed to be equal to ²˜0. Buhlmann
finds that this methodology yields a conditionally stationary bootstrap sample µbt and, unlike
the block bootstrap, does not exhibit artifacts in the dependence structure due to the depen-
dence between different blocks being neglected. By comparing the method of sieves against the
block bootstrap, Buhlmann (2002) finds that that the former has better finite sample properties
than the latter when dependence in the underlying sample is sufficiently weak.
Buhlmann (1997) shows that the sieve bootstrap yields consistent estimates of the first two mo-
ments of the sample mean under relatively weak conditions on the stationarity of the process
that generated the sample. Under slightly stronger assumptions, the sieve bootstrap also yields
consistent properties of the full distribution from which the sample is drawn. Full details of the
relevant conditions are given in the paper and are not reproduced here.
The method of sieves works well in the context of this paper because it minimises the compu-
tational burden of the bootstrap. Adopting a relatively large block size of 2,190 periods, or one
quarter of a calendar year, ensures that the properties of price series due to dependence are
captured adequately. The bootstrap involves randomly sampling with replacement from ARMA
model residuals for each price series and applying the estimated serial correlation 2,190 times
to blocks consisting of 2,190 observations each, producing a total of 4,796,100 observations. The
resulting histograms are plotted below.
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Figure 13: Bootstrap residuals for log NL price
Figure 14: Bootstrap residuals for log GB price
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Figure 15: Bootstrap residuals for log NO price
It can be seen by inspection that all three histograms are symmetric and have a regular shape13.
The distribution of stochastic shocks to the GB price as estimated by bootstrapping is very well
approximated by the normal distribution, displaying only marginally more kurtosis14. The es-
timated distributions of stochastic shocks to the NL and NO prices are characterised by a con-
siderably greater level of kurtosis. Although they both have regular shapes, they are not well
approximated by the normal distribution.
3.4 Price simulation
3.4.1 Calibrate distributions of residuals
For the purposes of simulating the stochastic component of GB prices, the normal distribution
is employed as per the results of bootstrapping in Section 3.3. Since the properties of the normal
13The graphs are centered around zero, though the bootstrapped residuals µbt may have a mean that is trivially
different from zero. For simulation purposes, the mean of bootstrapped residuals is calibrated to zero simply by
subtracting the actual mean of the entire sample of bootstrapped residuals from every observation and then ad-
justing the value of the constant for the simulated price accordingly
14Kurtosis is a measure of “peakiness” of a probability distribution. Higher kurtosis indicates that more of
the variance is accounted for by large infrequent deviations from the mean. More formally, kurtosis is given by(
E [(X −E [X ])4])/σ4, where X is a real valued random variable and σ is the standard deviation
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distribution are defined by its first two moments, the stochastic component of GB prices can be
modelled by specifying the mean and variance of the distribution of bootstrapped residuals µbt
from the ARMA model of the log GB price. In order to model the distributional properties of the
stochastic components of NO and NL prices, a more complex procedure is required. The distri-
butions of bootstrapped residuals µbt from ARMA models of log NL and NO prices are plotted in
Figures 13 and 15 respectively. Although each distribution appears to have a regular shape and
is symmetric, they both display a high level of kurtosis not characteristic of the normal distribu-
tion. The Weibull distribution possesses the property of having a very long tail and a sharp peak
for some parameter values15. However, it is defined over the positive domain only. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to use this distribution to model positive and negative values separately. For
negative values, its mirror image can be created simply by multiplying all values by −1.
We will create a symmetric composite distribution from two Weibull distributions, modelling
the positive and negative halves of the composite distribution separately. The first step in the
calibration process is to take absolute values of all observations of bootstrapped residuals µbt .
This produces an asymmetric distribution which takes values over the positive domain only.
The second step is to calibrate the Weibull distribution to the resulting sample by working out
the Weibull parameters that maximise its log likelihood functions given the sample data. The
log likelihood function of the Weibull distribution is given by
lW = T (ln(k)−kln(λ))+ (k−1)
T∑
t=1
ln(xt )−
T∑
t=1
(xt
λ
)k
,
where k > 0 is the shape parameter and λ > 0 is the scale parameter. The constant is not spec-
ified because it drops out when the function is maximised. The maximisation is carried out
numerically in Matlab and distribution parameters that represent the best fit are generated.
Denote by X the random variable characterised by the composite distribution and by X+ and
X− the positive and negative components of X respectively. X+ will have a Weibull distribution
and X− will have a ’negative’ Weibull distribution, being a mirror image of the distribution of
X+ around the mean. It follows that
X = Pr(X ≤ 0)X−+Pr(X > 0)X+.
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) for X is then given by
Pr(X ≤ x)= Pr(X ≤ 0) ·Pr(X− ≤ x)+Pr(X > 0) ·Pr(X+ ≤ x),
where Pr(X− ≤ x) and Pr(X+ ≤ x) are cdfs for positive and negative components of X respec-
tively. This can be summarised as
Pr(X ≤ x)=
{
Pr(X≤0)·Pr(X−≤x)
Pr(X≤0)+Pr(X>0)·Pr(X+≤x)
i f x≤0
i f x>0 .
15The exponential distribution can also display those properties, but it is in fact a special case of the Weibull
distribution
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Since the composite distribution models regression residuals, it will have a zero mean by con-
struction. Therefore Pr(X ≤ 0)= 12 and the above expressions can be simplified to
Pr(X ≤ x)=
{
1
2 Pr(X
−≤x)
1
2+ 12 Pr(X+≤x)
i f x≤0
i f x>0 .
The positive side of the composite distribution is modelled as a Weibull, hence Pr(X+ ≤ x) is
given by the cdf of the Weibull, i.e.
Pr(X+ ≤ x)= 1−exp
{
−
(x
λ
)k}
i f x > 0.
Since the negative side of the composite distribution is modelled as a negative Weibull, Pr(X− ≤
x) is given by one minus the cdf of the Weibull, taking the absolute value of x, i.e.
Pr(X− ≤ x)= exp
{
−
( | x |
λ
)k}
i f x ≤ 0.
This can be easily seen by looking at the two extremes of the possible values of x on the negative
side of the composite distribution. When x is a large negative number and given that the pa-
rameters λ and k of the Weibull distribution are always positive, | x | is a large positive number
and Pr(X− ≤ x) as defined above is close to zero. When x is a small negative number, | x | is a
small positive number and Pr(X− ≤ x) is close to one. Hence, for the composite distribution
Pr(X ≤ x)=
{
1
2 exp
{
−
( |x|
λ
)k}
1− 12 exp
{
−( xλ )k}
i f x≤0
i f x>0 .
A check on the suitability of the calibration process, as suggested in Nelson (1982), is to test
whether the bootstrapped residuals conform to the calibrated composite Weibull in the NL and
NO cases or the Normal representation in the GB case. Suppose that a random variable X has
a continuous probability distribution f and its associated cdf is given by F. Applying the proba-
bility integral transform
U = F (X )
generates a variable U which is uniformly distributed16. This means that for the symmetric
composite distribution centered around zero that is modelled here, Pr(X ≤ x) is also a uniformly
distributed random variable and
Pr(X ≤ x) ∈ [0, 1/2] f or x ≤ 0
16See Dodge, Y. (2003), The Oxford Dictionary of Statistical Terms, Oxford University Press
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Pr(X ≤ x) ∈ (1/2,1] f or x > 0.
If the calibration of bootstrapped residuals µbt is accurate, applying the probability integral
transform with the calibrated distributional parameters to the bootstrapped data will produce
uniformly distributed data.
The test is based on the property of the cdf of a uniform distribution, which is simply a 45º line.
The probability integral transform is applied separately for the positive and negative sides of
the distribution of bootstrapped residuals modelled by the composite Weibull distribution and
in a single step for bootstrapped GB price residuals. The resulting observations are then sorted
in ascending order and graphed against a 45º line. If the resulting graph does not differ signifi-
cantly from a straight 45º line, this indicates that the calibration process successfully mimics the
properties of the data.
The results of the test for each set of bootstrapped residuals may be seen in Appendix C. In
each case, the calibration process appears to successfully mimic the properties of the underlying
data.
3.4.2 Obtain simulated prices
For the purposes of simulating interconnectors, it is important to be able to specify dependence
between stochastic shocks in the connected markets. Such dependence could arise from factors
such as shocks caused by variable wind output in neighbouring markets, which are likely to be
correlated. The dependence between any two random variables is often described by the linear
correlation coefficient. However, linear correlation is not preserved when a non-linear transfor-
mation is applied to one or both of those random variables. This is too restrictive as simulating
stochastic price shocks will involve applying the probability integral transform, set out in Sec-
tion 3.4.1, which is a non-linear transformation. A viable alternative to linear correlation exists
in rank correlation. Rank correlation is preserved under any monotone transformation17 and is
invariant to the choice of marginal distribution.
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, denoted by ρ, is a non-parametric measure of statistical
dependence between two variables. It assesses how well the relationship between two random
variables Xi and Yi can be described using a monotonic function. It is calculated by converting
raw scores Xi and Yi to ranks xi and yi . If no two ranks are tied18, Spearman’s rank correlation
17The probability integral transform and its inverse are monotone transformations
18Tied ranks do not occur in the simulations carried out in this paper since they are zero probability events with
continuous distributions
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coefficient is given by
ρ = 1− 6
∑n
i=1
(
xi − yi
)2
n
(
n2−1) .
When simulating stochastic price shocks, the dependence structure is specified using Spear-
man’s rank correlation. The methodology set out in this section refers to simulating two sets of
stochastic price shocks, but is easily generalised to simulating any number of interdependent
random variables. Whilst random draws from a multivariate normal distribution can be gener-
ated directly by many appropriate software packages, most cannot generate random draws from
a multivariate Weibull distribution19 or specify a dependence structure between random draws
from different distributions. However, in the context of this paper, both would be required in
order to accurately simulate the effect of connecting NO, NL and GB markets. This is achieved
as set out below.
Suppose that we would like to simulate the stochastic shocks for NO and GB prices. The former
is characterised by a composite distribution as set out in Section 3.4.1 and the latter is charac-
terised by a normal distribution with mean µ1 and standard deviation σ1. Suppose further that
the Spearman rank covariance factor for the two sets of stochastic price shocks is given by ρ.
The first step is to simulate a sample from a bivariate normal distribution with mean
[
0
0
]
and
covariance matrix
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
. Next, apply the probability integral transformU = F (X ), where X is
the bivariate normal random variable generated earlier,U is the bivariate uniform random vari-
able resulting from the transformation and F (.) is the cdf of a multivariate normal with mean[
0
0
]
and covariance matrix
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
. U will have the same rank dependence structure that
was present in X .
The next step is to generate two sets of stochastic price shocks with the required distributional
properties and dependence structure. From Section 3.4.1, supposing that a random variable
X has a continuous probability distribution f and its associated cdf is given by F, applying the
probability integral transform
U = F (X )
generates a variableU which is uniformly distributed. It follows that applying the inverse of the
above transformation
X = F−1(U )
to a uniformly distributed random variable generates a random variable that is distributed ac-
cording to f . If a random variable follows some parametric distribution, this process allows the
19This is the case with Matlab 7, which is used here
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distribution of that random variable to be transformed into any other parametric distribution
as long as both of their respective cumulative distribution functions are known.
Denote byU1 the marginal uniform associated with the GB stochastic price shocks. Applying the
inverse probability integral transform, X1 = F−1(U1), where F−1 is the inverse cdf of a univariate
normal with associated mean of µ1 and standard deviation ofσ1, gives marginal normal X1 with
parameters µ1and σ1. Denote by U2 the marginal uniform associated with NO stochastic price
shocks. As derived in Section 3.4.1,
Pr(X ≤ x2)=
{
1
2 exp
{
−
( |x2|
λ
)k}
1− 12 exp
{
−( x2λ )k}
i f x2≤0
i f x2>0 .
Denote by x−2 the observations from the negative side of the composite distribution and by x
+
2
the observations from the positive side. For the negative side
u2 = 1
2
exp
{
−
( | x−2 |
λ
)k}
.
Hence applying the inverse probability integral transform to all observations in u2 that satisfy
u2 ≤ 12 , which means solving the above expression for | x2 |, yields
| x−2 |=λ (− ln(2u2))1/k .
Since x−2 ≤ 0,
x−2 =−λ (− ln(2u2))1/k .
It is easy to show that the pre-set rank dependence structure is preserved when all observations
of | x−2 | are multiplied by −1 to obtain x−2 . Recall that, for the negative side of the composite
distribution, u2 ∈ [0, 1/2]. When u2 is close to zero and given that the parameters λ and k of the
Weibull distribution are always positive, λ (− ln(2u2))1/k is a large positive number and multi-
plying by −1 makes it a large negative number. Thus multiplying by −1 turns one of the lowest
values in the distribution of U2 into one of the lowest values in the distribution of X−2 . Equally,
when u2 is close to 1/2, λ (− ln(2u2))1/k is close to zero and multiplying by −1 does not change
this. Thus multiplying by −1 turns one of the highest values in in the distribution ofU2 into one
of the highest values in in the distribution of X−2 . Hence the rank dependence structure of u2 is
preserved under this transformation.
For the positive side of the composite distribution
u2 = 1− 1
2
exp
{
−
(
x+2
λ
)k}
.
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Applying the inverse probability integral transform to all observations in u2 that satisfy u2 > 12
yields
x+2 =λ (− ln(2(1−u2)))1/k .
Finally, putting all x−2 and x
+
2 together produces a sample with the required distributional prop-
erties and dependence structure.
As an additional check on the accuracy of the calibration process set out in Section 3.4.1, the
results of this exercise can be seen below. In each case, the blue bars represent the distribution of
randomly sampled bootstrap residuals and the red line represents the distribution of simulated
stochastic price shocks that are calibrated as described in Section 3.4.120. For all three sets of
data, the properties of the bootstrapped residuals, including fat tails, are closely replicated by
the calibrated samples.
Figure 16: Calibrated residuals for log NL price
20In each case, 27,792 separate observations were generated
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Figure 17: Calibrated residuals for log GB price
Figure 18: Calibrated residuals for log NO price
The next step in simulating electricity prices is to generate the deterministic component of
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prices. This is carried out in the same way as generating predicted values from a regression.
Given the vector of estimated coefficients b from the ARMA model of log electricity prices and
the matrix of deterministic factors X , the predictable component of log electricity price y∗ is
simply given by
y∗
t×1
= X
t×n · bn×1.
The deterministic properties of prices can be manipulated by changing the individual values
in vector b. The final step is to add up the vectors of the stochastic components of log electric-
ity prices generated in Section 3.4.2 and the deterministic components of log electricity prices
generated here and take the exponent of the resulting vector to obtain the required simulated
prices.
3.5 Market integration
The effect of connecting two or more markets on the level and volatility of prices in those mar-
kets, as well as the revenues from one or both interconnectors, is simulated using an algorithm
that mimics an efficient market coupling mechanism. For each hourly period, it calculates the
market equilibrium solution and optimum flows over interconnectors under the assumption
that transmission constraints are not binding21. It then checks if the solution violates any of
those constraints, and if it does, calculates separate equilibria for markets that are constrained
from one another. This calculation is carried out period by period, with equilibrium prices and
revenues calculated for each period.
For the purposes of this exercise, unless stated otherwise, it is assumed that if three markets
are connected, they are connected in line in the order of GB-NL-NO. The price effect of inter-
connectors is calibrated to the econometric estimates obtained in Parail (2009). In the case of
GB, the price effect of BritNed on the GB price is assumed to be equivalent to the price effect
of NorNed on the NL price after adjusting for market size and interconnector size. The effect of
BritNed on the NL price is as for NorNed after adjusting for interconnector size. The algorithms
assume that power always flows from the low price region to the higher price region. They also
assume that transmission losses are zero, which, in the case of DC links, is not far from the truth.
Interconnector availability is assumed to be 100% unless stated otherwise. This means that the
interconnector revenues estimated in this exercise represent an upper bound on what is feasible
in reality. The two algorithms, and the corresponding derivations, are set out in full in Appendix
D.
21The transmission constraints for NorNed and BritNed in the base case are 700MW and 1,000MW respectively
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4 Applications
4.1 Comparison of historic and simulated prices
This section firstly attempts to answer the question of what would have happened if the NorNed
interconnector had been operational since 1 Jan 2006, the beginning of the sample period, and
how would this situation have changed if BritNed came online at the same time. It does so in
the specific context of NorNed and BritNed, taking the properties of the historic NL, NO and GB
electricity prices as given. This exercise is then repeated using simulated prices. These prices
have stochastic and deterministic properties that are identical to historic prices except that the
stochastic element is obtained from bootstrapped regression residuals. This gives a measure of
the bias introduced into forecasts by using historic price data.
Differences between historic and bootstrapped price samples occur because of the presence of
strong autocorrelation in stochastic shocks affecting prices. Taking an example relating to fuel
prices, imagine that the historic sample of electricity prices is characterised by an unexpected
shock to gas prices that made them much higher and more volatile than usual for a significant
proportion of the sample period, feeding directly into electricity prices. In the context of Euro-
pean electricity markets, a short gas dispute between the Ukraine and Russia could exemplify
this kind of situation. Autocorrelation would mean that the shock persists for a long time, affect-
ing the mean level and the volatility of electricity prices for the entire sample period. However,
bootstrapping would unravel the effect of shock persistence, thus producing the underlying dis-
tribution of shocks to electricity prices that has a lower mean and is less volatile than the corre-
sponding distribution for the historic sample.
Since NorNed had actually been operational for a part of the sample period, the first step is to
unravel its effect by subtracting the estimated effect of NorNed on historic NL and NO electric-
ity prices. This is done on the basis of the effect of NorNed on prices in those two markets as
estimated in Parail (2009). Once this step is complete, we have three historic stand-alone hourly
price series spanning the period between 01 Jan 2006 and 03 Mar 2009.
The next step involves applying the algorithms that simulate the effect of either connecting NL
and NO via NorNed or connecting NL with both NO and the GB via NorNed and BritNed. The
results are compared in terms of the mean levels and variances of prices in the connected mar-
kets, as well as revenue generated by the interconnectors. The precise method for calculating
post-connection prices and interconnector revenues is derived in Appendix D. Interconnector
revenue is given in units of € per MW per hour and is thus calculated simply as the difference in
post-connection electricity prices between the connected markets. The nominal capacities for
NorNed and BritNed are 700MW and 1,000MW respectively. The sensitivity table also shows the
effect of increasing the capacity of both interconnectors by factors of 2, 4 and 8 respectively. This
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is done under the assumption that the price effect of interconnectors increases proportionally
with their size.
The top half of the table shows the result of connecting NL and NO only, while the bottom half
shows the result of connecting NL, NO and GB. Table columns differ in the size of interconnec-
tors simulated. The top half of the second column, for example, shows the effect of connecting
NL and NO with a 700MW cable, while the bottom half of that column shows the effect of con-
necting NL and NO with a 700MW cable and connecting the GB and NL with a 1,000MW cable.
Figure 19: Simulation results using historic data
A quick glance at the figures would reveal that, without exception and regardless of the capacity
of NorNed and BritNed, interconnector revenues per MW per hour are greater than the differ-
ence between the average prices in the connected markets. This is due to variations in electricity
prices around the mean, which represent additional opportunities for interconnectors to gen-
erate revenue. As will be demonstrated in Section 4.2.6, it is possible for an interconnector to
generate substantial amounts of revenue without any difference in the mean prices of the mar-
kets it connects.
As expected, connecting different markets results in absolute price convergence as well a re-
duction in price volatility in the market where that volatility is initially greater. These effects
are increasing in the size of connections. In absolute terms, the price decrease in the higher
price region is greater than the price increase in the lower price region. This happens for two
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reasons. The first reason is that the effect of an interconnector on prices is given by a percent-
age change22. A given percentage change will have a greater absolute effect when applied to
larger values and corresponds to flows over an interconnector having a greater effect in abso-
lute terms on prices in the higher priced region. The second reason is related to the first and is
partly driven by the shape of the price distribution, which has a long tail on the right, making
positive price shocks larger than negative price shocks in absolute terms. This can be seen in
Appendix A. When arbitraging stochastic price differences, the interconnector will, on average,
have a greater absolute effect on positive shocks than on negative shocks, thus driving average
prices down in both markets, all other factors being equal.
Connecting two markets with volatile prices appears to reduce price volatility in both markets.
This is the case when GB is connected to NL. However, when price volatility is considerably
lower in one of those markets, as is the case with NO, volatility actually increases in that mar-
ket. Price changes can be exported indirectly via another market. This is demonstrated by the
result that the NO price is always higher when GB is connected to NL than when there is no GB-
NL link. The picture is more complex with respect to volatility. Connecting NL to GB appears
to lower NO price volatility for all but very large possible BritNed capacities, which reflects the
Mean Variance Portfolio effect of price shock diversification leading to lower “portfolio” vari-
ance. However, for very large BritNed capacity, volatility is exported from GB to NO indirectly
via NL. This is because the NL price becomes increasingly aligned with the GB price due to the
GB market’s larger size as the capacity of BritNed increases, which means that is becomes less
aligned with the NO price and thus becomes an exporter of GB price volatility.
Revenue does not increase proportionally with interconnector capacity due to the fact that ar-
bitrage decreases price differences. The effect is very minor for lower interconnector capacities
around 1,000MW and severe at higher capacities of 3,000 - 4,000MW for markets of the size of
NO and NL. Interestingly, for capacities upwards of 1,000MW, the effect on NorNed of connect-
ing GB and NL is positive. This is because the GB price is higher on average and more volatile
than the NL price. Hence, when GB and NL are connected with a high capacity cable, GB ex-
ports its higher and more volatile prices to NL. Since prices in NO are lower and less volatile,
this effect increases the revenue from NorNed.
Figure 20 compares the results obtained with historic prices to those obtained using simulated
prices with stochastic properties obtained from the bootstrapping exercise.
22As estimated in Parail (2009)
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Figure 20: Comparison of historic and bootstrap data analysis
Note first of all the properties of prices with bootstrapped stochastic components as compared
to historic prices before the effects of any interconnectors are simulated. Both the mean and
the variance of the NL price are underestimated by using historic data. The same is true for the
variance of the NO price. The opposite is true for the GB electricity price, where using historic
data greatly overestimates both the price mean and the variance.
Once the effects of NorNed and BritNed are simulated, the predicted revenue of the NorNed
interconnector is underestimated by around a quarter when using historic price data. This is
not surprising given that historic data underestimates the average price difference between NL
and NO as well as price volatility in both markets. BritNed revenue is only underestimated by
around 10% when using historic data. Abstracting from the complexities that serial correlation
introduces into the distribution of historic prices, using historic prices underestimates the av-
erage price difference between GB and NL as well as the variance of prices in the latter. On the
other hand, it greatly overestimates the variance of GB prices. Since the last of those biases has
the opposite effect on BritNed revenue from the first two, it is not surprising that the resulting
bias on the forecast of BritNed revenue is relatively small.
Although bootstrapping stochastic shocks to electricity prices provides an unbiased long run
forecast of future stochastic price shocks, in the short run, the actual outcome can differ sig-
nificantly from that forecast due to persistence in those shocks. In the case of NorNed, the year
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when it became operational was characterised by unusually high reservoir levels in NO and high
electricity prices in NL. Since reservoir levels are mostly a cumulative function of precipitation,
they persisted for a long period of time, depressing electricity prices in NO and allowing NorNed
to generate much more revenue than anticipated.
To put the differences in predicted interconnector revenues based on historical and simulated
data into perspective, some estimate of the costs associated with each interconnector is re-
quired. The estimates provided here are crude and for demonstration purposes only. The to-
tal cost of the NorNed interconnector is estimated to be €600m23. Assume that the associated
running costs are negligible and that outages between 6 May 2008 and 3 Mar 2009, which ran
at approximately 8%, are representative of it’s entire period of operation. Assume further that
the interconnector has an useful life of 30 years24. Given these assumptions, the Internal Rate
of Return (IRR) for NorNed based on the revenue estimates using historic data is 23%25. The
IRR for NorNed based on simulated prices, keeping all other assumptions constant, is 29%. For
BritNed, scaling the cost of NorNed proportionally by capacity and cable length, the total cost of
the project should be €384m. Making the same assumptions as for NorNed, the IRR for BritNed
is 42% years based on historic prices and 48% years based on simulated prices.
Whilst the above analysis of the investment case for the two interconnectors is based on a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions, given the extremely high IRR estimated here, it is consistent with
the interpretation that that the business case for both interconnectors, and especially BritNed,
is very strong. Indeed, there is some evidence that the estimates of NorNed profits made in the
planning stage were pessimistic. The forecast annual profits for NorNed were €64m, whereas
the total profits in only first two months of operation amounted to €50m.
4.2 Simulated prices
4.2.1 Introduction
This section takes advantage of the flexibility offered by the model in order to examine the main
determinants of interconnector revenues, as well as the drivers behind the effect of intercon-
nectors on price levels and volatility in the connected markets. For each factor, the effect of
which is examined in a simulation, the analysis mimics the properties of historic prices in the
GB, NO and NL in one of the presented scenarios, deriving the stochastic properties of prices
23Source: Power Engineering International (PenWell Corp.)
24This assumption complements the assumption of zero operational and maintenance costs as the useful life of
the interconnector could be significantly extended given appropriate maintenance
25Based on the scenario where BritNed is also operational
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from bootstrapped residuals, and then makes changes to that factor incrementally in the other
scenarios to determine the effect of those changes.
The factors examined in this section include differences in mean prices between connected
markets, differences in the average daily pattern of prices, volatility of stochastic price shocks
and correlation of stochastic shocks in connected markets. Changes in those factors are put
into the context of their possible drivers. Changes in mean electricity prices could be caused
by changes in fuel prices. This is explored in Section 4.2.3 using estimates of the long-run rela-
tionship between fuel prices and electricity prices obtained in Section 3.2. Changes in volatility
of electricity prices could be caused by changes in penetration of wind generation in the over-
all generation mix. This is explored in Section 4.2.4 using estimates from Green and Vasilakos
(2009). Likewise, correlation in stochastic shocks in the connected markets could be caused by
consistent wind patterns and geographic proximity of those markets. This factor is explored
in Section 4.2.5. Finally, Section 4.2.6 examines the question of whether an interconnector be-
tween two extremely similar market can generate substantial revenue from arbitrage.
As before, the response of market prices to electricity flows across interconnectors is calibrated
to the estimates obtained in Parail (2009) and adjusted for market and interconnector size. Each
simulation generates 8,760 hourly observations, being equal to the number of hours in a non-
leap year. Where needs dictate, this exercise abstracts away from the example of NL, GB and NO,
referring instead to markets A, B and C where market B is in the middle and can be connected
to A alone or to A and C. In these instances, unless otherwise stated, the size of both intercon-
nectors is assumed to be 1,000MW and the size of markets A, B and C to be the same as that of
NL. The effects of interconnectors on prices are calibrated accordingly.
4.2.2 Daily price pattern
The average daily price pattern is derived by calculating the average predicted price for each
given hour across all days in our data sample. This is done using the estimated coefficients of
dummy variables that represent different hours of the day taken from the regression described
in Section 3.226. It therefore indicates the consistent tendency for prices to differ in peak and
off-peak hours over a 24 hour period. This section focuses on the differing average daily price
patterns in NO on the one hand, and in the GB and NL on the other27. It tests the extent to
which interconnector revenue is driven by any such consistent differences and also whether
those differences influence the extent of price stabilisation in the connected markets. The idea
26To avoid perfect multicolinearity, there are only 23 such dummy variables, with the 11pm to midnight hour
dropping into the constant term of the regression
27See Figure 1 for details
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behind this is that NorNed revenue and price stabilisation in NL caused by NorNed may be
driven to a large extent by the smooth average daily price pattern in NO.
The sensitivity of key outputs of the model to changes in the average daily price pattern in GB
and NL is given in Figure 21 below. The format in which results are presented differs slightly
from Figure 20. For mean and variance of NL, NO and GB electricity prices, rather than giving
actual mean and variance figures for each simulated scenario, the table gives the percentage
change in those parameters resulting from connecting NL and NO markets in the top half of the
table and from connecting NL, NO and GB markets in the bottom half of the table. This format
for presenting simulation results is used for the remaining simulations.
The first column in Figure 21 gives interconnector revenues and the change in mean and vari-
ance of prices when, for each of the three markets, the stochastic properties of prices are cali-
brated to corresponding bootstrapped residuals with stochastic shock rank correlations calcu-
lated from historic residuals and the deterministic properties of prices are calibrated to the cor-
responding regression results obtained in Section 3.2 as described in the paragraph above. The
subsequent columns give those outputs under scenarios where the average daily price pattern
in NL, GB or both is flat, meaning that there is no difference in expected prices across different
hours of any given day. All other properties and model parameters remain the same throughout
the exercise.
A flat average daily price pattern is derived by setting the coefficients of the dummy variables
for different hours of the day to zero and calibrating the constant term of the regression from
Section 3.2 such that simulating the relevant price series as described in Section 3.4 using these
coefficients results in the same average price across all hours and all days of the sample as would
simulating the same price series using the actual estimates obtained in Section 3.2. The result
will be a price series with the same stochastic and deterministic properties as the baseline price
series but with no consistent price difference across different hours of the day.
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Figure 21: Daily price profile
The first thing to notice is that eliminating consistent daily price variation in NL only reduces
NorNed revenue by 11%, suggesting that a consistent difference in average daily prices and price
differences resulting from stochastic price shocks play a more important role in determining
NorNed revenue. Also worth noting is the result that the effect of NorNed on price volatility in
NL is virtually the same with or without consistent price variation across hours. Less surpris-
ing effects of this change are slightly greater convergence of average prices in the two markets
connected by NorNed and a significantly greater reduction in price volatility in NO.
Adding BritNed into the equation produces one additional surprising result. With a flat daily
profile of GB prices, BritNed revenue is higher compared to the baseline case. However, with a
flat daily profile of NL prices, BritNed revenue is slightly lower than in the baseline case. One
would expect a flat price profile in one of the two countries to increase BritNed revenue in both
cases because that would generate significant consistent price differences where there were only
small differences before, both markets being characterised by large differences between peak
and off-peak prices. This intuition turns out to be wrong because any such consistent differ-
ences also interact with the difference in average prices. Figure 22 demonstrates this using plots
of average price differences by hour between the GB and NL from simulated data.
44
Figure 22: Simulated NL - GB price difference curves for a typical year
The average absolute price difference between the GB and NL across all hours is 50% higher
when the GB has a flat price profile than when NL has a flat price profile. The equivalent differ-
ence is virtually the same in the baseline scenario as in the scenario where NL has a flat price
profile.
Overall, the results indicate that consistent differences in the daily price profile can create arbi-
trage opportunities for interconnectors, though their role may not be as important as those of
stochastic price differences and consistent differences in average prices. Simple intuition may
turn out to be wrong when trying to predict interconnector revenue on the basis of differing av-
erage daily price profiles, necessitating the use of modelling techniques. Some intuitive results
are obtained with regard to the effect of the price profile in one market on price volatility in the
connected market. Connecting to a market with a less variable daily price profile is more effec-
tive in reducing price volatility after controlling for other factors. However, due to the stochastic
properties of prices, connecting a market with a flat daily price profile to one characterised by
large differences between peak and off-peak prices may still reduce price variance in the former.
The one hour price difference between the GB and NL turns out to be insignificant in deter-
mining BritNed revenue. Modelling GB and NL prices as if they are in the same time zone only
reduces BritNed revenue by 0.1% compared to the baseline scenario, keeping all other factors
constant, and it makes no visible difference to any other outputs of the model.
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4.2.3 Differences in average prices
This section deals with the extent to which interconnector revenues are driven by differences in
average prices and whether such differences can influence the effect of interconnectors on price
levels and volatility in the connected markets. Figure 23 compares the change in key model
outputs in the baseline case against scenarios where the average price in NO, GB or both is as
high as the average price in NL, leaving all other factors unchanged. In the baseline scenario,
average NL, NO and GB prices before the effect of interconnectors is simulated are €62/MWh,
€37/MWh and €49/MWh respectively.
Figure 23: Average price
For NorNed, simulation results show that connecting NO and NL markets when they are char-
acterised by the same average price but different stochastic and deterministic properties results
in more even sharing of the benefits of interconnection for the consumers in the two markets.
The average price and price volatility are reduced in both markets. The effect on price volatility
is unsurprising, being the direct result of arbitrage. The effect on average prices is due to the
inherent asymmetry of positive and negative shocks to electricity prices as discussed in Section
4.1. Removing a difference in average prices between the two markets reduces NorNed revenue
by approximately 19%.
The effect of BritNed on average GB and NL prices is largely the same as for NorNed, remem-
bering that the GB is a much larger market and is thus less affected by the interconnector. Note,
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however, that the effect of BritNed on GB price volatility is positive. This shows that volatility
can also be exported from a volatile NL market to a less volatile GB market28. Factors that make
such outcomes more likely are examined in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. Removing the difference in
average prices between the GB and NL markets makes very little difference to BritNed revenue,
suggesting that this difference on its own is not a significant driver of interconnector revenue in
this case.
To put these results into context, one of the factors that can produce a consistent difference in
average prices between two markets is a change in fuel prices. Utilising the results of the analysis
in Section 3.2, a difference between the average NO and NL electricity prices would be canceled
out by a 40% fall in the gas price29. For the period covered by our data set, the average price
of gas in the NL market was €57. The proportion of days for which the NL gas price was less
than 60% of the average during that period was around 15%, which gives a rough measure of
the probability of average NL and NO electricity prices becoming aligned due to a fall in the gas
price.
Since the relationship between gas and electricity prices in GB and NL is estimated to be approx-
imately the same, and gas prices in the two markets are highly correlated, a change in the price
of coal is the only factor related to fuel prices that could potentially change the difference in av-
erage electricity prices between the two markets. However, as the simulation results presented
in Figure 23 demonstrate, the difference in average prices plays only a small role in determining
BritNed profits. Therefore changes in the price of coal are unlikely to have a significant effect on
BritNed profits.
4.2.4 Variance of stochastic price shocks
This section deals with the effect of changes in the variance of stochastic price shocks in one of
the connected markets on the key outputs of the model. The free variable in this experiment is
the variance of the stochastic component of the NL electricity price30. In the first column, this
variance is set to zero, meaning that the only variation present in the NL price is due to deter-
ministic factors such as the time of day or the day of the week. In the second column, this vari-
ance is set at a half of the estimated variance of bootstrapped residuals. In the third and fourth
28Although GB prices are more volatile than NL prices in the historic sample, the opposite is true for prices gen-
erated from bootstrapped residuals, which are used here
29Assuming that NL electricity and gas prices change proportionally, a 40% fall would reduce the NL electricity
price from €62/MWh to €37/MWh
30More precisely, it is the variance of stochastic shocks to the log electricity price. Hence, even setting aside the
complication of adding up the stochastic and deterministic components of prices, an increase in the variance of
the log stochastic component of prices increases the variance of nominal prices, but not in a linear way
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column, the variance is set at the baseline level and twice of the baseline level respectively. All
other factors remain unchanged throughout the experiment.
Figure 24: Variance of stochastic shocks
As expected, increasing the variance of stochastic price shocks in NL increases the revenue from
both interconnectors. It is perhaps surprising that reducing the variance to zero reduces BritNed
revenue by only a quarter and NorNed revenue by less than that as compared to the baseline
level. However, it must be remembered that the variance of stochastic shocks in GB and NO
remains at the baseline level in all scenarios, hence interconnectors can still arbitrage stochastic
shocks originating from those markets in addition to any deterministic price differences.
At higher stochastic shock variance levels, the effect of interconnectors on mean prices in the
connected regions increases. This is due to the fact that the distribution of prices acquires an
even longer tail on the right side of the distribution at higher variance levels. Greater price
volatility in NL means that it is more likely to be exported to its neighbouring markets through
the interconnector. The ability of either one or both interconnectors to dampen price volatil-
ity in NL decreases as the volatility level in that market increases, indicating that, for a given
capacity level, the ability of an interconnector to arbitrage stochastic price shocks is limited.
The level of stochastic price volatility can vary greatly between different markets. This is demon-
strated clearly in the case of the three markets considered here and needs to be properly ac-
counted for in any model of merchant interconnector revenues. However, this volatility may
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also change with time in a way that is to some extent predictable. The most obvious change
that is likely to lead to greater stochastic price volatility is an increase in wind penetration in
the overall generation mix. It would be very helpful to have an estimate of how greater wind
penetration is likely to affect interconnector revenues.
The relationship between wind penetration and electricity price volatility has received surpris-
ingly little attention in the applied economic literature. Studies of the effects of wind power have
focused almost exclusively on system stability in the presence of fluctuating wind output, leav-
ing electricity prices out of the equation. More specifically, as far as the author is aware, at the
time of writing, no econometric study had been undertaken to estimate the effect of wind pen-
etration on electricity prices. One paper that tackles this question from an applied economic
angle is Green and Vasilakos (2009). They use historic wind profiles for thirty onshore and off-
shore regions across Great Britain for the period between 1994 and 2005 by matching them on
an hourly basis to actual hourly demand using supply function equilibria given the existing gen-
eration base and assuming varying degrees of wind penetration31.
The average price variance over all hours between 1994 and 2005 as estimated by the model in
Green and Vasilakos increases by 14% when the amount of wind capacity in the overall gen-
eration mix increases from 20GW to 30GW, keeping all other factors constant. An increase of
10GW in wind capacity represents approximately a 10% increase in total GB generation capac-
ity, though this figure does not take into account the intermittent nature of wind generation. In
the context of the NL generation base, 1.5GW of wind plant would add approximately 10% to
existing installed generation capacity. Referring back to Figure 24, a 14% increase in overall NL
price variance is roughly equivalent to a 7% increase in the variance of stochastic shocks to the
log NL price compared to the base level32. This change would be expected to increase NorNed
and BritNed revenues by approximately 2.4% and 3.8% respectively33.
Although the estimated effect of increasing wind penetration on interconnector revenues does
not appear to be big, it must be remembered that it is based on static analysis which assumes
that existing thermal generation capacity remains constant as wind capacity increases. This is
unlikely to happen in the medium and long term as greater wind capacity will push average
prices down. The model put forward by Green and Vasilakos predicts that an increase in GB
wind capacity from 20GW to 30GW would push the average GB electricity price down by around
5%. Hence an increase in wind penetration is likely to induce exit of thermal generators from
the market and more of the remaining thermal generators being restricted to operating in the
hours when prices are high because their marginal cost will be considerably higher than for
31The model is estimated for different degrees of market concentration. For the results presented here, the sce-
nario with six competing generators is used
32Derived from the NL price data used in the simulation
33This calculation assumes that the effect of stochastic log price volatility on interconnector revenues is locally
linear
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wind generators in windy periods. The dynamic effect of greater wind capacity would therefore
increase price volatility even further because peak electricity prices, or prices when wind power
is scarce, would have to rise substantially to compensate the remaining thermal generators for
their capital investment, which will be spread over much fewer hours of operation. Therefore
the static effect of increasing wind capacity represents a lower bound on the resulting increase
in electricity price volatility.
4.2.5 Correlation of stochastic price shocks
This section tests the role of correlation in stochastic price shocks between different markets in
determining interconnector revenues and the effect of interconnectors on the level and volatil-
ity of prices in the connected markets. The free variable in this case is Spearman’s rank cor-
relation coefficient defined over the stochastic element of all three sets of electricity prices. It
varies between zero correlation in the first column and 0.75 in the last column. As before, all
other model and price parameters remain the same throughout the experiment. Since there
is no baseline case, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the actual observed rank correlations for
the stochastic elements of the three price series. These are given as follows: Corr(NL,GB)=0.52;
Corr(NL,NO)=0.39; Corr(GB, NO)=0.26.
Figure 25: Correlation of stochastic shocks
The first thing to note is that NorNed revenue is resilient to increases in rank correlation of
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stochastic price shocks in the two markets, suggesting that consistent differences in average
prices and differences in the daily and seasonal patterns of prices drive a significant proportion
of NorNed revenue. This is not, however, the case with BritNed. Increasing the rank correlation
of stochastic price shocks in the GB and NL from 0 to 0.75 reduces BritNed revenue by 37%,
which suggests that stochastic price shocks are a more significant driver of revenue in the case
of BritNed than NorNed.
The other noteworthy result is that increasing rank correlation in stochastic price shocks in-
fluences the effect of interconnectors on price volatility differently for more and less volatile
markets. For NL, which is by far the most volatile of the three, the effect of the two interconnec-
tors in reducing price volatility is stable for a wide range of rank correlations. This is not the case
for GB and NO, both of which are characterised by much lower price variance. Volatility in those
markets is reduced at low correlation factors and increased at high correlation factors as a result
of being connected to NL.
The underlying reason for this difference is the long right tail of the distribution of electricity
prices. Because of the long tail, large and infrequent positive shocks account for the bulk of price
variance in a volatile market, which in this case is NL. A high rank correlation between stochastic
shocks in a volatile and a relatively stable market means that the largest positive price shock in
the former is likely to coincide with the largest positive shock in the latter. However, because the
magnitude of the largest positive shock in a volatile market is likely to be considerably greater,
an interconnector can still arbitrage this shock despite the high rank correlation.
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, wind generators can make a significant contribution to electric-
ity price volatility. The results presented here imply that interconnectors are likely to be less
effective at generating revenue and reducing price volatility caused by variable wind output if
wind patterns are highly correlated in the connected markets. They also imply that the bene-
fits of interconnection in terms of reduced price volatility and lower mean prices can be much
less evenly shared between the connected markets if stochastic price shocks in those markets
caused by factors such as variable wind output are highly correlated.
4.2.6 Connections between similarmarkets
So far, the analysis has focused on connecting the NL, NO and GB markets. These markets dis-
play significant differences in deterministic properties of the price curve, properties of the dis-
tribution of stochastic price shocks and market size, which make the logic of connecting these
markets compelling. However, this does not help to answer the question of whether connecting
similar markets can be a sensible proposition both in terms of sufficient interconnector revenue
that would cover the costs and also benefits to consumers in terms of lower and more stable
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electricity prices. This section addresses exactly this type of question by abstracting from the
specific example of the setup dealt with so far.
The following example refers to markets A, B and C, where market B is in the middle and can be
connected to A alone or to A and C. The size of both interconnectors is assumed to be 1,000MW
and the sizes of markets A, B and C are assumed to be the same as that of NL. The stochastic
and deterministic properties of prices in all three markets are calibrated to those of NL in the
first two columns and to those of GB in the last two columns. The rank correlation between the
stochastic shocks of any two markets is set at 0.5.
The first and third column of Figure 26 show the results of simulations calibrated as described
above, where the only source of price differences between markets comes from stochastic price
shocks that do not coincide. This represents a test of the benefits of connecting markets that are
very similar in all aspects, including their generation mix. The second and fourth column of the
table correspond to the first and third columns except that they also incorporate a 20% differ-
ence in mean prices between markets such that 0.8 ·mean(pA)=mean(pB )= 0.8 ·mean(pC ).
Figure 26: Connecting similar markets
Interconnector revenues are lower when the stochastic and deterministic properties of prices
correspond to those of GB. This is as expected because the variance of the stochastic component
of prices is much lower in GB than in NL. Also, because the average price is lower in GB, given
the shape of the distribution of electricity prices, this implies fewer large positive price shocks
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which make a noticeable contribution to interconnector revenues. Importantly though, inter-
connector revenues can still be generated despite no differences in average prices, deterministic
properties of prices and market sizes and a significant correlation in stochastic price shocks that
is calibrated to the correlation in such shocks between the GB and NL. Adding scenarios where
market B is connected to either one or two identical markets with 20% higher average prices
confirms that arbitrage on stochastic price differences is a greater contributor to interconnector
revenues than arbitrage on differences in mean prices.
Note that interconnectors reduce average prices and price variance in the connected markets
even when they are built between identical markets with strongly correlated stochastic shocks.
Given the different properties of prices in the GB and NL, it is not clear that the effect of inter-
connectors in terms of reducing average prices and price volatility in the connected markets is
different for those two calibrations if the connected markets have identical properties. Adding a
difference in average prices between markets does not appear to impact the ability of intercon-
nectors to arbitrage stochastic price differences. However, due to the shape of the distribution
of prices, it shifts reductions in price variance slightly in the favour of higher priced markets.
Also, with a difference in average prices, the interconnector reduces average price differences
between markets as expected.
5 Conclusion
This paper sets out a widely applicable procedure that generates an unbiased long-run estimate
of revenues of a proposed interconnector on the basis of limited historic price data. It also pro-
vides an estimate of the effect of that interconnector on the level and volatility of prices in the
connected markets. The paper improves on the methodologies used in existing empirical lit-
erature on interconnectors in a number of ways. It acknowledges that electricity prices in less
regulated markets are often very volatile and interconnector revenues can be generated from
this volatility.
Electricity price volatility is modelled explicitly, separating prices into their stochastic and de-
terministic components and bootstrapping the stochastic components in order to eliminate the
biases in historic data caused by serial correlation in stochastic price shocks. By proposing an
algorithm that mimics market coupling, it also models the effect of interconnectors on prices in
the connected markets and the feedback of that effect into interconnector revenues. The effect
of flows over an interconnector on prices in the connected markets is calibrated to an econo-
metric estimate of this effect obtained in Parail (2009).
The simulation methodology set out in this paper allows the stochastic and deterministic prop-
erties of prices, as well as most model parameters, to be varied freely. This flexibility is used
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to gauge the relative importance of the various drivers of interconnector revenues. It is found
that, generally, stochastic properties of prices play a more important role in determining in-
terconnector revenues than consistent deterministic differences and that it is possible for inter-
connectors to generate considerable revenues without any consistent price differences between
the connected markets.
Given the estimated relationship between fuel prices and electricity prices, it is also found that
medium-term changes34 in fuel prices are not generally a big driver of interconnector revenues.
However, exceptions to this may occur in cases similar to NorNed, where the relevant fuel price
plays no role in determining the electricity price in one of the connected markets.
Increasing penetration of wind power in the connected markets, given the results taken from
Green and Vasilakos (2009), can increase interconnector revenues even if the interconnector is
built between neighbouring countries where price shocks due to varying wind output are corre-
lated. However, more empirical research is needed into the long-term relationship between
wind penetration and electricity price volatility as currently available research is simulation
based and is only able to establish a lower bound on the extent of that relationship. The re-
sults also suggest that interconnectors can play an important part in reducing electricity price
volatility due to varying wind output. However, this effect is diminished when price shocks in
the connected markets are correlated.
Since one of the algorithms put forward in this paper permits the simulation of three markets
being connected in line, as expected, it is found that, generally, different interconnectors have
a negative effect on each other’s revenues, though given the capacities of the interconnectors
relative to the sizes of the connected markets considered here, this effect is found to be small.
34Where medium term denotes a period less than that in which a country’s generation mix can alter significantly
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A Price distributions
Figure 27: Distribution of NL price
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Figure 28: Distribution of NO price
Figure 29: Distribution of GB price
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B Autocorrelation functions of cointegrating equation residu-
als
Figure 30: Autocorrelation of NL cointegrating equation residuals
Figure 31: Autocorrelation of GB cointegrating equation residuals
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C Test of calibration accuracy
Figure 32: Test of calibrated log NL price residuals
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Figure 33: Test of calibrated log GB price residuals
Figure 34: Test of calibrated log NO price residuals
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D Market integration algorithms
D.1 2market algorithm
Annotation:
1. p(t ,2) represent prices in NL and NO respectively before any trading over the intercon-
nectors
2. I1 represents the NorNed interconnector, i.e. connection between markets 1 and 2
3. a and b represent elasticity parameters in markets 1 and 2 respectively such that 1MW of
imports from an interconnector into market 1 reduces the electricity price in that market
by a%
4. x represents the proportion of I1 used to transmit electricity in equilibrium, where nega-
tive numbers represent exports from market 1 (NL) to market 2 (NO).
Scenarios:
i) Markets 1 and 2 are coupled.
The first equation defines price equality between markets 1 and 2
p(t ,1)(1−aI1x)= p(t ,2)(1+bI1x).
The equilibrium usage of I1 is given by
x = p(t ,1)−p(t ,2)
I1(ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)) .
The equilibrium price in market 1 and 2 is given by
resul t (t ,α)= p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
)
whereα= {1,2}. Equilibrium revenue from I1 is zero. The condition for this equilibrium holding
is as follows
abs
(
p(t ,1)−p(t ,2)
I1(ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2))
)
≤ 1
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ii) The resulting price in market 1 is higher than in market 2. Prices in the two markets are as
follows
resul t (t ,1)= p(t ,1)(1−aI1)
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
Equilibrium revenue from I1 is given by
resul t (t ,3)= I1(p(t ,1)(1−aI1)−p(t ,2)(1+bI1))
The condition for this equilibrium holding is as follows
p(t ,1)(1−aI1)> p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
iii) The resulting price in market 1 is lower than in market 2. Prices in the two markets are as
follows
resul t (t ,1)= p(t ,1)(1+aI1)
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1−bI1)
Equilibrium revenue from I1 is given by
resul t (t ,3)= I1(p(t ,2)(1−bI1)−p(t ,1)(1+aI1))
The condition for this equilibrium holding is as follows
p(t ,1)(1+aI1)< p(t ,2)(1−bI1)
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D.2 3market algorithm
Annotation:
1. p(t ,1), p(t ,2) and p(t ,3) represent prices in NL, NO and the GB respectively before any
trading over the interconnectors
2. I1 and I2 represent NorNed and BritNed interconnectors respectively, i.e. connections
between markets 1 and 2 and between markets 1 and 3 respectively
3. a, b and c represent elasticity parameters in markets 1, 2 and 3 respectively such that
1MW of imports from an interconnector into market 1 reduces the electricity price in that
market by a%
4. x and y represent the proportions of I1 and I2 used to transmit electricity in equilibrium,
where negative numbers represent exports from market 1 (NL) to neighbouring markets.
Scenarios:
i) All three markets are coupled
The first two equations define price equality between the three markets.[
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1x+ I2y))= p(t ,2)(1+bI1x)
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1x+ I2y))= p(t ,3)(1+ cI2y)
]
The equilibrium usage of interconnectors is given by
x = ap(t ,1)p(t ,3)+ cp(t ,1)p(t ,3)−ap(t ,1)p(t ,2)− cp(t ,2)p(t ,3)
I1(abp(t ,1)p(t ,2)+acp(t ,1)p(t ,3)+bcp(t ,2)p(t ,3))
y = ap(t ,1)p(t ,2)+bp(t ,1)p(t ,2)−ap(t ,1)p(t ,3)−bp(t ,2)p(t ,3)
I2(abp(t ,1)p(t ,2)+acp(t ,1)p(t ,3)+bcp(t ,2)p(t ,3)) .
This gives an equilibrium price in all three markets of
resul t (t ,α)= p(t ,3)
(
1+ c ap(t ,1)p(t ,2)+bp(t ,1)p(t ,2)−ap(t ,1)p(t ,3)−bp(t ,2)p(t ,3)
abp(t ,1)p(t ,2)+acp(t ,1)p(t ,3)+bcp(t ,2)p(t ,3)
)
,
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where α= {1,2,3}. Equilibrium revenues from both interconnectors are zero, hence
resul t (t ,β)= 0,
where β= {4,5}. The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
abs
(
ap(t ,1)p(t ,3)+ cp(t ,1)p(t ,3)−ap(t ,1)p(t ,2)− cp(t ,2)p(t ,3)
I1(abp(t ,1)p(t ,2)+acp(t ,1)p(t ,3)+bcp(t ,2)p(t ,3))
)
≤ 1,
abs
(
ap(t ,1)p(t ,2)+bp(t ,1)p(t ,2)−ap(t ,1)p(t ,3)−bp(t ,2)p(t ,3)
I2(abp(t ,1)p(t ,2)+acp(t ,1)p(t ,3)+bcp(t ,2)p(t ,3))
)
≤ 1.
ii) Markets 1 and 2 are coupled. I2 is constrained with imports into market 1.
The first equation defines price equality between markets 1 and 2, given that I2 is constrained
with imports into market 1
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1x+ I2))= p(t ,2)(1+bI1x).
The equilibrium usage of I1 is given by
x = p(t ,1)(1−aI2)−p(t ,2)
I1(ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)) .
The equilibrium price in market 1 and 2 is given by
resul t (t ,α)= p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)(1−aI2)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
)
where α= {1,2}. The equilibrium price in market 3 is given by
resul t (t ,3)= p(t ,3)(1+ cI2) .
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= 0
resul t (t ,5)= I2
(
p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)(1−aI2)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
)
−p(t ,3)(1+ cI2)
)
.
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
abs
(
p(t ,1)(1−aI2)−p(t ,2)
I1(ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2))
)
≤ 1
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p(t ,3)(1+ cI2)< p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)(1−aI2)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
)
.
iii) Markets 1 and 2 are coupled. I2 is constrained with exports out of market 1.
The first equation defines price equality between markets 1 and 2, given that I2 is constrained
with exports out of market 1
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1x− I2))= p(t ,2)(1+bI1x).
The equilibrium usage of I1 is given by
x = p(t ,1)(1+aI2)−p(t ,2)
I1(ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)) .
The equilibrium price in market 1 and 2 is given by
resul t (t ,α)= p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)(1+aI2)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
)
where α= {1,2}. The equilibrium price in market 3 is given by
resul t (t ,3)= p(t ,3)(1− cI2) .
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= 0
resul t (t ,5)= I2
(
p(t ,3)(1− cI2)−p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)(1+aI2)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
))
.
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
abs
(
p(t ,1)(1+aI2)−p(t ,2)
I1(ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2))
)
≤ 1
p(t ,3)(1− cI2)> p(t ,2)
(
1+b p(t ,1)(1+aI2)−p(t ,2)
ap(t ,1)+bp(t ,2)
)
.
iv) Markets 1 and 3 are coupled. I1 is constrained with imports into market 1.
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The first equation defines price equality between markets 1 and 3, given that I1 is constrained
with imports into market 1
p(t ,1)(1−a(I2y + I1))= p(t ,3)(1+ cI2y).
The equilibrium usage of I2 is given by
y = p(t ,1)(1−aI1)−p(t ,3)
I2(ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)) .
The equilibrium price in markets 1 and 3 is given by
resul t (t ,α)= p(t ,3)
(
1+ c p(t ,1)(1−aI1)−p(t ,3)
ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)
)
where α= {1,3}. The equilibrium price in market 2 is given by
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1+bI1) .
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= I1
(
p(t ,3)
(
1+ c p(t ,1)(1−aI1)−p(t ,3)
ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)
)
−p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
)
resul t (t ,5)= 0.
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
abs
(
p(t ,1)(1−aI1)−p(t ,3)
I2(ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3))
)
≤ 1
p(t ,2)(1+bI1)< p(t ,3)
(
1+ c p(t ,1)(1−aI1)−p(t ,3)
ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)
)
.
v) Markets 1 and 3 are coupled. I1 is constrained with exports out of market 1.
The first equation defines price equality between markets 1 and 3, given that I1 is constrained
with exports out of market 1
p(t ,1)(1−a(I2y − I1))= p(t ,3)(1+ cI2y).
65
The equilibrium usage of I2 is given by
y = p(t ,1)(1+aI1)−p(t ,3)
I2(ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)) .
The equilibrium price in market 1 and 3 is given by
resul t (t ,α)= p(t ,3)
(
1+ c p(t ,1)(1+aI1)−p(t ,3)
ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)
)
where α= {1,3}. The equilibrium price in market 2 is given by
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1−bI1) .
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= I1
(
p(t ,2)(1−bI1)−p(t ,3)
(
1+ c p(t ,1)(1+aI1)−p(t ,3)
ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)
))
resul t (t ,5)= 0.
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
abs
(
p(t ,1)(1+aI1)−p(t ,3)
I2(ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3))
)
≤ 1
p(t ,2)(1−bI1)> p(t ,3)
(
1+ c p(t ,1)(1+aI1)−p(t ,3)
ap(t ,1)+ cp(t ,3)
)
.
vi) The resulting price in market 1 is higher than in markets 2 and 3.
Prices in the three markets are as follows
resul t (t ,1)= p(t ,1)(1−a(I1+ I2))
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
resul t (t ,3)= p(t ,3)(1+ cI2)
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= I1(p(t ,1)(1−a(I1+ I2))−p(t ,2)(1+bI1))
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resul t (t ,5)= I2(p(t ,1)(1−a(I1+ I2))−p(t ,3)(1+ cI2))
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1+ I2))> p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1+ I2))> p(t ,3)(1+ cI2)
vii) The resulting price in market 1 is lower than in markets 2 and 3.
Prices in the three markets are as follows
resul t (t ,1)= p(t ,1)(1+a(I1+ I2))
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1−bI1)
resul t (t ,3)= p(t ,3)(1− cI2)
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= I1(p(t ,2)(1−bI1)−p(t ,1)(1+a(I1+ I2)))
resul t (t ,5)= I2(p(t ,3)(1− cI2)−p(t ,1)(1+a(I1+ I2)))
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
p(t ,1)(1+a(I1+ I2))< p(t ,2)(1−bI1)
p(t ,1)(1+a(I1+ I2))< p(t ,3)(1− cI2)
iix) The resulting price in market 1 is higher than in market 2 but lower than in market 3.
Prices in the three markets are as follows
resul t (t ,1)= p(t ,1)(1−a(I1− I2))
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
resul t (t ,3)= p(t ,3)(1− cI2)
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= I1(p(t ,1)(1−a(I1− I2))−p(t ,2)(1+bI1))
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resul t (t ,5)= I2(p(t ,3)(1− cI2)−p(t ,1)(1−a(I1− I2)))
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1− I2))> p(t ,2)(1+bI1)
p(t ,1)(1−a(I1− I2))< p(t ,3)(1− cI2)
ix) The resulting price in market 1 is lower than in market 2 but higher than in market 3.
Prices in the three markets are as follows
resul t (t ,1)= p(t ,1)(1−a(I2− I1))
resul t (t ,2)= p(t ,2)(1−bI1)
resul t (t ,3)= p(t ,3)(1+ cI2)
Equilibrium revenues from I1 and I2 are given respectively as follows
resul t (t ,4)= I1(p(t ,2)(1−bI1)−p(t ,1)(1−a(I2− I1)))
resul t (t ,5)= I2(p(t ,1)(1−a(I2− I1))−p(t ,3)(1+ cI2))
The conditions for this equilibrium holding are as follows
p(t ,1)(1−a(I2− I1))< p(t ,2)(1−bI1)
p(t ,1)(1−a(I2− I1))> p(t ,3)(1+ cI2)
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